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NOTES
In State v, Weedon," Justice Tate's views became the majority
opinion as the court held that an accused who had been advised by his
attorneys that he could answer any questions asked of him at his booking
did not waive his rights against self-incrimination and right to counsel.
The defendant made extremely prejudicial remarks to the booking officer
in response to questioning which violated an agreement between his
attorneys and state police officers. Justice Tate again cited Brewer and
reasoned that the state cannot be permitted to prejudice the accused's
constitutional rights by disregarding an agreement not to question him
unless his attorneys are present .16
Brewer strengthens the right to counsel afforded criminal defendants,
broadly interprets the meaning of "interrogation," and indicates that the
Court will strictly construe the requirements for a valid waiver. However,
it is important to note that the Court has apparently returned to a more
particularized, case-by-case approach to the confession and right to coun-
sel issues, emphasizing the factual aspects of the case as was done in
decisions prior to Miranda. Therefore, the prosecution might well be
successful in convincing the Court to distinguish future cases from
Brewer.
Revealing a new trend in the Court's attitude toward criminal proce-
dure cases, Brewer v. Williams reverts to the traditional pre-Escobedo
and pre-Miranda method of dealing separately with fifth and sixth amend-
ment problems. Heralded by the news media and interested parties as the
decision in which Miranda's fate would be determined, Brewer presents a
great surprise to the unsuspecting reader as the Court barely mentions
Miranda. Brewer is especially noteworthy in demonstrating the reluc-
tance of five present justices to overrule Miranda and their possible future
preference to sidestep such a major issue by basing decisions on the sixth
amendment or other relatively uncontroversial grounds.
Emily M. Phillips
EXEMPTION OF SENIORITY SYSTEMS UNDER TITLE VII
Litigation was instituted against a nationwide common carrier of
motor freight and a union representing a large group of the carrier's
employees alleging that the seniority system established by the collective-
55. 342 So. 2d 642 (1977), rehearing denied on March 3, 1977.
56. Id. at 645.
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bargaining agreement between the defendants was in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 Under the seniority system, an employee who
transferred between bargaining units was required to forfeit all previously
accumulated bargaining unit seniority. The federal court of appeals deter-
mined that since racial and ethnic minorities had never been hired into the
line driver bargaining unit, 2 the seniority system perpetuated the effects of
pre-Act discrimination by 'locking in' minorities into city driver posi-
tions. 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed that finding and held
that a seniority system which did not have its genesis in racial discrimina-
tion is exempt from the prohibitions of Title VII of the Act and does not
become illegal for the sole reason that the system may perpetuate pre-Act
discrimination. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
97 S.Ct. 1843 (1977).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in
employment relations on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin. Its primary purpose is to "assure equality of employment opportu-
nities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens." 4 Any employer who is engaged in an "industry affect-
ing commerce" 5 with twenty-five or more employees and labor organiza-
tions with twenty-five or more members employed by a covered employer
6
are subject to the prohibitions of the Act. 7
Under the Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is
empowered to investigate charges that an employer or labor organization
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1970 and Supp. IV
1974), as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Also contained in the Act are provisions on voting, public
accommodations, public education and federally assisted programs. See generally
Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARV. L. REV. 684 (1965).
2. Line drivers are engaged in long hauling between company terminals and
are paid more than city drivers. The lower court determined that in general the line
driver position was the more desirable of the driving jobs; that finding was expli-
citly left undisturbed by the Court in the instant case. International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 n.55 (1977). Separate bargaining units for
the two groups are provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1851
n.3.
3. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). See generally
Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1971). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) & (e) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
7. For a discussion of the coverage of Title VII in general see Benewitz,
Coverage Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 17 LAB. L.J. 285 (1966).
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is engaging in a pattern or practice of discriminatory conduct.8 If the
Commission finds reasonable cause to believe the charges, it is bound to
attempt to eliminate the practice by conciliation.9 If those efforts fail, the
Commission may bring suit to enjoin the discrimination.'° Additionally,
the individual discriminatees may sue to enjoin the practice and to recover
damages. "
Title VII not only makes it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate in hiring, but also for an employer to discrimi-
nate against an individual with respect to his "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" or to "limit, segregate, or
classify" an employee in any manner which would tend to deprive the
employee of employment opportunities.' 2 The Act also forbids a labor
organization from causing the employer to discriminate. I3 Consequently, a
person who has been hired but placed into an inferior job classification or
given inferior conditions of employment because of his minority status
may bring an action under Title VII.1
The Civil Rights Act took effect July 2, 1965;11 discriminatory
practices occurring prior to that date may not serve .as the basis for a Title
VII claim. However, the use of a departmental seniority system' 6 which
'locks in' employees into inferior jobs and perpetuates the effects of the
pre-Act discrimination has been found to constitute a present and continu-
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974). The procedures followed
by the E.E.O.C. are: charge, notice of charge, investigation, determination of
reasonable cause, endeavor to conciliate, and the filing of suit. E.E.O.C. v. Ray-
mond Metal Products Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Ark. 1974).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974). Originally, the Commis-
sion had no independent enforcement powers but would refer cases to the Attorney
General. See materials cited in note I, supra.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974). Bringing the charge of
discrimination before the E.E.O.C. is a prerequisite to an individual suit. See, e.g.,
Kaplowitz v. University of Chicago, 387 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. III. 1974). For a
discussion of remedies available to individuals under the Act see Walker, Title VII:
Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 495, 496-98 (1966).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
13. Id. § 2000e-2(c) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
14. See note II, supra.
15. See materials cited in note I, supra.
16. For the purposes of this casenote, a seniority system may be defined as a
set of rules governing job movements, including promotion, transfer, downgrading
and layoff in a bargaining unit. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and




ing violation of the Act. For example, a company may have hired blacks
prior to the Act only into its lowest paying and less desirable departments.
After the effective date of the Act, the company would now be required to
hire minorities into all departments. However, an employee wishing to
transfer out of the less desirable department might be required to forfeit all
seniority' 7 accumulated in the department. Consequently, the transferee
would be subject to layoffs and have comparatively less seniority 8 with
which to bid on jobs. The employee would always be inferior in seniority
to an employee hired at the same time but not discriminated against in
hiring. The employee would therefore be discouraged from transferring' 9
and be effectively locked into his present inferior job. Consequently, the
effects of the pre-Act discrimination would be perpetuated.
The discriminatory nature of such seniority systems has been consis-
tently recognized by the federal courts. Early in the history of Title VII
litigation, the disparate impact theory 20 was developed by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,21 when the Court stated: "Congress
not only proscribed overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminate in operation." 22 Although Griggs did not involve a
discriminatory seniority system, the lower federal courts applied the
17. Seniority rights may be derived from the collective bargaining agreement
between employer and union. Where such an agreement exists, both union and
employer have been held liable for a discriminatory seniority system. See, e.g.,
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971).
18. Competitive status seniority delegates priorities among employees for pro-
motion, job security, shift preference, and other employment advantages. It is to be
contrasted with benefit seniority which grants rights, such as pension benefits or
vacation time to all workers based on time served. Competitive seniority rights are
based on the length of service either within a certain bargaining unit (departmental
seniority) or service on the job (plant seniority). Workers possessing the greatest
seniority, provided they are qualified, are given first choice in job movements. See
S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT 106-14 (1960). See also Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602 (1969). This casenote is primarily
concerned with competitive status seniority.
19. Although this casenote will focus on the impact of seniority systems on
departmentalized work schemes, its application is relevant to any restrictions
placed on transfer between departments.
20. For application of the disparate impact theory, see, e.g., McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972); General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Id. at 431.
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Griggs rationale to such cases, holding that a seniority system which is
objective on its face but which gives present effects to the past discrimina-
tion is violative of the Act. 23 That view, although not specifically accepted
by the Supreme Court, was adopted by a majority of the federal courts of
appeals .24
The jurisprudence indicates that several factors may be pertinent in
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination through the use of a
departmental seniority system. Initially, it must be proven that the em-
ployer hired minority employees before the effective date of the Act.25 In
addition, employees must have been discriminated against before the
effective date of the Act. 26 In this particular type of case, the discrimina-
tion usually took the form of assignment to a department in which the
conditions of employment were less desirable. However, it was not neces-
sary to show economic loss or assignment to a less desirable department to
prove a prima facie case of discrimination, since the Act mandates equal
opportunity for any job. 27 Additionally, statistics showing the stratifica-
tion of minorities among the less desirable departments have played an
important role in proving discrimination. 28 Most importantly, a necessary
element in proving a prima facie case of discrimination is evidence that the
seniority system served to 'lock in' the effects of the pre-Act discrimina-
tion.2 9
23. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970);
Local 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
24. See note 51, infra.
25. Numerous cases have indicated that the legislative history of section 703(h)
makes it clear that no remedy would be available to workers not hired before the
Act because of discrimination but later hired. See, e.g., Jersey Central Power and
Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded
96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int. Har. Co., 502 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). But see Acha v. Beame, 531
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976) (court felt the legislative history was "cloudy" and allowed
remedy).
26. See, e.g., Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906
(1972); Dobbins v. Local 212, I.B.D.S., 292 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Ohio 1968).
27. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United
States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. National
Lead Co., 438 F.2d 935 (8th Cir. 1971).
28. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972); Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906
(1972); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970).
29. Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972): "Under the Civil Rights
1977]
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Once a prima facie case of discrimination was established, the busi-
ness necessity of the practice was the only defense available to the
employer; 30 good faith was no defense. 3' Business necessity meant that
the practice was necessary to the safety and efficiency of the enterprise.
32
The defense was difficult to maintair33 because the courts required proof
that the necessity of the system outweighed its discriminatory impact34 and
that no less discriminatory alternative was available to the employer.
35
Consequently, the defense was rarely successful.
36
Because of the difficulty in defending a practice on the ground of
business necessity, defendants in this type of litigation soon began raising
the defense that seniority systems are exempted from Title VII by § 703(h)
of the Act. 37 That section provides that the maintenance of a 'bona fide'
Act of 1964, the Federal Courts have consistently held that seniority provisions are
illegal only if they tend to freeze or perpetuate the effects of historic or traditional
discrimination in hiring or promotion." See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Bailey v. American Tobacco Co., 462 F.2d 160
(6th Cir. 1972). Other restrictions which are not necessarily embodies in the senior-
ity system are subject to a similar attack. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1970) (educational requirements); Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d
1040 (6th Cir. 1975) (departmental transfers); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1970) (no transfer rules).
See also note 19, supra.
30. See, e.g., Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.), vacated, 423
U.S. 809 (1975); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
32. See, e.g., Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 450 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971);Jones v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1970).
33. Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1976).
34. See, e.g., Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
35. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Rogers v.
Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1976).
36. See cases cited in notes 33-35, supra.* But see Williams v. American Saint
Gobain Corp., 447 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1971).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974), provides in part: "Not-
withstanding any other provision of this subsection, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of prod-
uction or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin .... " The section also regulates the use of ability
tests by employers. Discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, and national origin,
if these factors are bona fide occupational qualifications, and discrimination for
reason of communist party membership or national security is also excepted from
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(e)-(g) (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
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seniority system shall not be unlawful solely because it results in differ-
ences in treatment of employees, provided that the resulting differences in
treatment are not due to an intent to discriminate. Section 703(h) was
written to define which practices are illegal when the post-Act operation of
a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating pre-Act discrimination.
38
In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 39 a landmark federal district court
decision in this area, the defense that all seniority systems are exempted
from Title VII by § 703(h) was first rejected.' The Quarles case involved
a departmentalized seniority system in the tobacco industry in which
blacks hired before the effective date of Title VII were almost exclusively
assigned to the lower paying, less desirable departments. In rejecting the
defense that the seniority system was exempt from Title VII, the court
defined a "bona fide" seniority system as one characterized by a lack of
discrimination. 4 The court in Quarles determined that despite § 703(h),
the Act does not sanction present inferior conditions of employment Which
are the result of an intent to discriminate.42 The court noted that the fact
that the intent to discriminate occurred before the effective date of the Act
was irrelevant since § 703(h) does not distinguish between pre-Act and
post-Act intent.4 3 Thus, a seniority system which perpetuates pre-Act
discrimination and effectively "locks in" minority employees into less
desirable jobs cannot be "bona fide" under § 703(h). The decision
concludes that "it is apparent that Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that
existed before the Act."44
Several points concerning the meaning of § 703(h) were clarified by
the jurisprudence which followed the Quarles decision. The definition of
"bona fide" was limited to include only those seniority systems which
could be explained on nonracial grounds and which did not unnecessarily
38. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976).
39. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). Judge Butzner, writing the opinion for
the court in Quarles, acknowledged that he was freely drawing from a recent law
review note, Seniority Discrimination, supra note 16.
40. See also United States v. Chesapeake & O R:R., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652 (2d Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v. Sheetmetal
Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
41. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 518.
44. Id. at 517.
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inhibit the progress of previously excluded minorities.45 Intent was broad-
ly defined to mean merely that the employer did what he intended to do.
Discriminatory intent was required to be but one motivating factor in the
adoption of a seniority system. 6 Drawing from the language and legisla-
tive history of § 703(h),47 the courts found additional evidence that
Congress did not intend to immunize seniority systems which perpetuate
pre-Act discrimination. 48 Many courts concluded that Congress only in-
tended to protect whites with seniority from displacement by junior minor-
ity employees.49 In their opinion, Congress did not intend to cause the
present and future subordination of minorities to whites or the widening of
the economic gap between the two groups.1 ° After the adoption of the
Quarles decision by the majority of the courts of appeals, 51 the defense
that § 703(h) extends immunity to departmental seniority systems was
seldom raised until the instant case.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, 52 acknowledges in the
instant case that but for § 703(h) the seniority system in question would be
a continuing violation of Title VII. However, the Court concludes, con-
trary to the majority of the courts of appeals, that both the language and
legislative history of § 703(h) evidence that Congress intended to extend a
"measure of immunity" to such systems. The Court states that the mere
45. See Local 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 18, at
1612; Seniority Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1270.
46. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Jones
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1970).
47. The legislative history of § 703(h) includes three interpretive memoranda
introduced into the Congressional Record by the bipartisan managers of Title VIT.
The memoranda state that Title VII, because its effect is prospective and not
retrospective, would not affect existing seniority rights. Therefore, according to the
memoranda, a black would not be given seniority rights at the expense of a white
worker and a black could be fired pursuant to a "last hired, first fired" system
provided it was done because of his "last hired" status and not because of race. 110
CONG. REC. 7207, 7212-17 (1964). See generally Vass, Title VII: Legislative History,
7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
48. See the cases cited in note 40, supra.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971); Local 189, United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
50. Seniority Discrimination, supra note 16, at 1270. See also the cases cited in
note 40, supra.
51. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, cites over thirty cases in which
six courts of appeal indicated agreement with the holding of Quarles. International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1876 n.2 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
52. Justice Marshall filed an opinion dissenting from the Court's holding con-
cerning seniority systems, in which Justice Brennan concurred.
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fact that a seniority system may perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimi-
nation does not of itself prevent the system from being a "bona fide"
seniority system.
Bona fide was functionally defined by the Court in relation to the
defendants' seniority system. The seniority system in the instant case is
composed of two bargaining units, the line driver unit and the city driver
unit. Whites are assigned to both units according to the company's needs;
however, prior to the enactment of Title VII minorities were assigned only
to the lower paying city driver unit. The Court noted that the system
applies equally to both whites and minorities in the inferior department and
that all are discouraged from transferring. The Court also observed that the
"placing of line drivers in a separate bargaining unit from other employees
is rational, in accord with industry practice, and consistent wtih N.L.R.B.
precedents." 53 Noted, without explanation by the Court, was the fact that
the system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination and is main-
tained free from any illegal purpose. The single factor that the seniority
system perpetuates the pre-Act discrimination does not in the Court's
opinion render it illegal.
The impact of the instant case upon seniority systems adopted before
the Civil Rights Act of 19645 will only be realized through further
litigation. At a minimum, the decision will immunize many seniority
systems in which the discriminatory impact of the system is minimal.
Alternatively, the ruling could extend immunity to all but the most inten-
tionally discriminatory seniority systems. However, several passages from
the decision suggest a more restrictive interpretation. Initially, the majori-
ty points out that "703(h) does not immunize all seniority systems." 55
Moreover, Justice Stewart acknowledges that insofar as Quarles and its
progeny stood for a view that a system which is "discriminatory itself" or
had its "genesis in racial discrimination" cannot be bona fide, such
decisions are consistent with the instant case.5 6 The possibility that sys-
tems different from the one encountered in the instant case may not be
exempted is clearly implied by the Court.
Factual distinctions existing between the seniority system dealt with
in Teamsters and those treated by past jurisprudence suggest the impact of
53. 97 S. Ct. at 1865.
54. Relief to post-Act discriminatees posed no problem in Teamsters since the
Court had previously decided that § 703(h) does not bar retroactive seniority to
post-Act discriminatees. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
55. 97 S.Ct. at 1863.
56. Id. at 1860 n.28.
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the instant case may be limited. In a practical sense, because the present
seniority system is peculiar to the freight carrier industry, most freight
carrier seniority systems will now meet the "bona fide" test. However,
some distinctions suggest that the systems in Quarles and many of the
cases following it may not have met the test set forth by the Court. First,
many of the seniority systems challenged in the past had departments
composed entirely of minority employees. Secondly, while minorities
comprised only a small proportion of the less desirable department in
Teamsters, in much of the jurisprudence minorities were almost the sole
members of the less desirable classification. The seniority systems which
had been challenged in much of the prior jurisprudence may have had their
"genesis in racial discrimination" and may not have been maintained
"free from any illegal purpose" if a department was maintained exclu-
sively for minorities. Moreover, there existed no rational basis for the
departmentalization scheme in many of the past cases and few were
consistent with N.L.R.B. precedents. Although many of the earlier cases
had seniority systems based on the practice of the industry, this standard
would certainly become less important where it could be shown that the
industry practice itself was discriminatory.
The above distinctions, if valid, suggest that in seniority systems
where minorities have been exclusively and overtly segregated into the
less desirable departments, the system could not be "bona fide" under the
present ruling. Additionally, these factual distinctions imply that the Court
would be less likely to find a system bona fide where the discriminatory
impact of the system upon minorities is great when balanced with the
relative competitive loss to whites also employed in the less desirable
departments. Consequently, proof of an absence of white workers in the
less desirable departments may become more important than proof that
few minorities are employed in the more desirable departments.
Teamsters is significant in that it demonstrates the Court's tendency
to relieve employers and unions of responsibility for their pre-Act dis-
crimination, which admittedly was not an illegal practice when commit-
ted. Civil rights advocates and minority workers will view the decision as
a setback in the movement for economic equality. In overruling the
unanimous opinion of the courts of appeals for the second time in the
current term concerning Title VII,57 the Court shows an increasing tenden-
cy to limit the scope of the Act.
57. In General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), a majority of the Court
overturned the unanimous opinion of the courts of appeals in finding that peti-
tioner's disabilities benefits plan was not violative of Title VII for failure to cover
pregnancy -related disabilities. See 97 S.Ct. at 1878 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 38
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The majority also demonstrates an inclination to retreat from the
Griggs rationale of recognizing discrimination by the impact, rather than
the intent, of the practice. Since the Court will now uphold a seniority
system whose adoption was not racially motivated, the test of discrimina-
tion will focus on the intent in adoption rather than on the discriminatory
effects of the seniority system. Good faith, although not a defense under
the disparate impact theory, presumably could be a valid defense to
discrimination thus defined. These consequences are inevitable in the shift
from the prior jurisprudential test of "perpetuation" to the new test of
"motivation."
Teamsters marks a departure from the more easily proved Quarles
rationale by distinguishing between a discriminatory seniority system and
a seniority system which is not exempt from Title VII. While Quarles and
its progeny essentially equated discriminatory with non-exempt, the ma-
jority now holds that a seniority system may be discriminatory in operation
but be immunized from Title VII prohibitions. New factors introduced by
the Court demonstrate that a greater amount of evidence of motivation will
be necessary to prove that a seniority system is not bona fide. However,
the exact quantum of proof will only be defined in future litigation.
Wayne A. Shullaw
THE TRADITIONAL BAN ON ADVERTISING BY ATTORNEYS
AND THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As a part of its regulation of the State Bar, the Arizona Supreme
Court imposed and enforced a disciplinary rule that restricted advertising
by attorneys. In March of 1974 the defendants, members of the State Bar,
opened a "legal clinic" intending to provide legal services at modest fees
to people of moderate income who did not qualify for government spon-
sored legal aid. The attorneys relied on a high volume, low profit per
client practice and handled only routine matters that could be disposed of
speedily. After two years of limited success, the defendants placed an
advertisement in a newspaper which stated that they offered "legal serv-
ices at very reasonable fees" and which listed their fees for certain
services. Both defendants admitted that the advertisement was a clear
violation of the Arizona State Bar Association's Disciplinary Rules. The
United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the regulation
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